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I S S U E  DEFINITION 
C o m m e r c i a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - J a p a n  a l l i a n c e ,  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
h a v e  b e g u n  t o  d o m i n a t e  t h e  d i a l o g u e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  n a t i o n s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
f r i c t i o n  p o i n t s  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  o v e r  c h r o n i c  U.S.  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  
w i t h  J a p a n ,  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  J a p a n e s e  p r o f e c t i o n i s m ,  a n d  r a p i d  i n c u r s i o n s  i n t o  
U.S.  m a r k e t s  b y  J a p a n e s e  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s .  
T h e s e  t r a d e  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  J a p a n  h a v e  s e r v e d  as  a c a t a l y s t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  f o r  r e n e w e d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p r e s s u r e s .  Many U.S. w o r k e r s  v i e w  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  a s  b e i n g  c a u s e d  b y  c o m p e t i t i o n  f r o m  J a p a n .  
Some U . S .  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  f e e l  r e s e n t f u l  t h a t  J a p a n e s e  e x p o r t e r s  c a n  g a i n  e a s y  
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  o p e n  U.S. m a r k e t ,  w h i l e  t h e i r  a t t e m p t s  t o  s e l l  i n  
J a p a n  a r e  o f t e n  h i n d e r e d  g r e a t l y .  W h e t h e r  a c c u r a t e  o r  n o t ,  t h e s e  v i e w s  a r e  
c a u s i n g  a n  e r o s i o n  o f  p u b l i c  s u p p o r t  f o r  o p e n  t r a d e  w i t h  b o t h  J a p a n  a n d  t h e  
r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  
S e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  U.S.  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  w i t h  J a p a n  i n v o l v e  G o v e r n m e n t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n t o  w h a t  i s  n o r m a l l y  p r i v a t e  e c o n o m i c  a c t i v i t y .  F i r s t ,  . J a p a n  
has  b e e n .  w i l l i n g  t o  make c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n c e s s i o n s  t o  h e l p  r e c t i f y  t h e  t r a d e  
i m b a l a n c e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e ' n e g a t i v e  o p i n i o n s  t o w a r d  J a p a n e s e  e x p o r t s  c a n  s p i l l  
o v e r  t o  g e n e r a l  U . S . - J a p a n  r e l a t i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  v i t a l .  
i n t e r e s t s .  T h i r d ,  i s s u e s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s m  a n d  " u n f a i r "  t r a d i n g  p r a c t i c e s  b y  
c o u x t r i e s  c a n  b e  r e s o l v e d  o n l y  b y  g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d -  n o t  t h r o u g h  m a r k e t  f o r c e s .  
B A C K G R O U N D  A N D  POLICY ANALYSIS 
MERCHANDISE T R A D E  
O v e r  t h e -  1 9 7 6 - 8 1  p e r i o d ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n c u r r e d  a c u m u l a t i v e  
m e r c h a n d i s e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  w i t h  J a p a n  o f  $ 5 6  b i l l i o n .  F o r  1 9 8 0 ,  t h e  d e f i c i t  
was $ 1 0 . 4  b i l l i o n .  F o r  1 9 8 1 ,  t h e  d e f i c i t  s o a r e d  t o  $ 1 5 . 8  b i l l i o n  ( $ 1 8 . 1  
b i l l i o n  c o u n t i n g  s h i p p i n g  c o s t s  f o r  i m p o r t s ) .  
M e r c h a n d i s e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t s w i t h  J a p a n  b e g a n  i n  1 9 6 5  a n d  g r e w  t o  a n  a n n u a l  
r a t e  o f  $ 3 . 2  S i l l i o n  by  1 9 7 1 .  T h i s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  A u g u s t  1 9 7 1  d e c i s i o n  
t o  d e v a l u e  t h e  d o l l a r  a n d  i m p o s e  a t e m p o r a r y  1 0 %  s u r c h a r g e  o n  many i m p o r t s .  
T h e  1 9 7 3 - 7 5  r e c e s s i o n  d e p r e s s e d  U . S .  i m p o r t s  a n d  r e d u c e d  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  
b u t  w i t h  r e c o v e r y  a n d  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  U.S. e c o n o m y  a f t e r  1 9 7 6  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  
g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  o f  J a p a n e s e  p r o d u c t s ,  t h e  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t  b a l l o o n e d  t o  $ 1 1 . 6  b i l l i o n  i n  - 1 9 7 8 .  T h e  l a g g e d  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  y e n  a n d  s l o w d o w n  i n  t h e  U . S .  e c o n o m y  i n  1 9 7 9  r e d u c e d  t h e  
d e f i c i t  s o m e w h a t ,  b u t  i n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 8 1  i t  r o s e  a g a i n .  
TABLE 1 
U.S. Merchandise Imports, Exports, and Balances 
With Japan and With The World 
[in millions of U.S. dollars (f.a.s.(l))] 
Year Exports to Imports from U.S. Balance U.S. Balance 
- Japan Japan With Japan With World 
1973 8,357 
1974 10 , 723 
1975 9,567 
1976 10,196 




1981 21 r 851 
Jan-Sept. 
1982 15,544 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1) free alongside ship Data are on a balance-of-payments basis. 
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As the data in Table 1 indicates, the bilateral trade deficit with Japan 
has been a major contributor to the U.S. merchandise trade deficit. In 
overall trade, however, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit is generally 
offset to a major extent by a large U.S. trade surplus in services. The 
offset in servies with Japan, however, has been minor. 
From an economic point of view the bilateral deficit in merchandise trade 
with Japan should not be a major conc.ern as long .as total U.S. trade in 
goods and services is roughly in balance. Merchandise trade is only part of 
the total flow of international economic resources, and Japan is merely one 
country among many trading partners. 
For 1981, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit was at $27.9 billion, while 
the U.S. current account showed a surplus of $4.8 billion. Actions by the 
United States to reduce the trade deficit with Japan, moreover, could 
backfire by causing the European Economic Community with which the United 
States maintains a trade surplus to demand similar concessions. An improving 
merchandise trade balance, furthermore, could strengthen the dollar which 
would make Japanese exports even more competitive in the U.S. market, and 
U.S. exports less competitive abroad. The net economic effect, therefore, 
could be Small. Attempts to diminish the imbalance by restricting Japanese 
exports would generally cause inefficiencies and incur sizeable consumer 
costs in the U.S. market. An increase in U.S. exports to Japan accomplished 
by reducing Japanese trade barriers, however, would generate economic 
Senefits to both sides, although Japanese producers would be hurt. 
From a political point of view, however, the chronic trade deficits with 
Japan have proven untenable in some regions of the United States. Market 
penetration by exports from Japan has occurred mainly in industries in which 
Japan is particularly competitive. These industries, such as steel, 
television receivers, and automobiles are often geographically concentrated. 
Japan's market penetration has also occurred so rapidly, in some cases, that 
domestic industry has found it extremely difficult to adjust. The perceived 
loss of American jobs to Japanese exports, therefore, whether accurate or 
not, has generated pressures that make the chronic trade imbalance 
politically difficult.to tolerate. 
Renewed protectionist pressures stemming partly from Japanese import 
competition also threaten the general U.S. policy objective of an open world 
trading system. The benefits of free trade are difficult to argue to persons 
who feel trade with Japan is causing unemployment or feel that Japan's 
markets are not equally open to U.S. exporters. 
The difficulty domestic firms have in competing with increased exports 
from Japan has been exacerbated by other economic factors. Recession, high 
interest rates, rapidly rising costs for energy and raw materials, as well as 
Government regulations have forced major changes in product design, 
composition, and processes for making certain products. Just when certain 
industries are facing tremendous design and retooling costs, they are also 
being confronted by highly competitive products from Japan. 
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
Table 2 shows the commodity composition of U.S. trade with Japan by major 
category. Note that trade in agricultural products goes virtually one-way 
CRS- 4 IB81011 UPDATE-12/28/82 
rom the United States to Japan. Trade in automotive vehicles and parts as 
ell as in other consumer goods, however, travels essentially the opposite 
irection. In capital goods (except automotive) trade flows both ways, but 
Japan holds a trade' surplus of about $2 billion. Trade in industrial 
supplies and materials also flows both ways, except that the United States 
holds a trade surplus of about $3 billion. The major source of the bilateral 
trade deficit is in automotive vehicles and consumer goods. 
In- terms of specific commodities, the leading U.S. exports to Japan are 
soybeans, maize, logs, wheat, cotton, airplanes, rawhide, and scrap metal. 
Leading imports from Japan are automotive vehicles (and parts), 
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TABLE 2 
U.S. Merchandise Trade and Balances With Japan by Commodity Group 
L980 and 1981 
[in Sillions of dollars (f .a.s.) ] 
Commodity 
U.S. Imports U.S. Exports Balance . 
1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981 
Total 30.7 37.6 20.8 21.8 -9.9 -15.8 
~ o o d i ,  Feeds, Beverages 0.3 0.3 5.4 5.9 5.1 5.6 
Industrial Supplies 
and Materials 5.9 7.2 9.5 9.0 3.6 1.8 
Capital Goods, Except 
Automotive 6.6 8.6 4.1 4.6 -2.5 -4.0 
Automotive Vehicles, 
Parts, Engines 11.4 13.0 
Consumer Goods (nonfood) 
Except Automotive 6.2 8.3 
Other 0.3 0.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
and Import Trade. 
1.2 1.3 -5.0 -7.0 
0.4 0.9 0.1 0.6 
Highlights of U.S. Export 
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i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s ,  r a d i o  r e c e i v e r s ,  m o t o r c y c l e s ,  t a p e  r e c o r d e r s ,  
c a m e r a s ,  m e t a l  f a s t e r n e r s ,  t e l e v i s i o n  r e c e i v e r s ,  o f f i c e  m a c h i n e s ,  
m e t a l - c u t t i n g  m a c h i n e  t o o l s ,  a n d  c a l c u l - a t i n g  m a c h i n e s .  
A c u r s o r y  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m m o d i t y  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t r a d e  m i g h t  l e a d  o n e  
t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i s  l i k e  a  p l a n t a t i o n  s u p p l y i n g  J a p a n  w i t h  
raw m a t e r i a l s  a n d  b u y i n g  b a c k  h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y  m a n u f a c t u r e s .  A c t u a l l y ,  
h o . w e v e r ,  U .S .  a . g r i c u l t u r a 1  e x p o r t s  a r e  p r o d u c e d  by  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  a d v a n c e d  
m e t h o d s .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a l s o  e x p o r t s  a i r c r a f t  a n d  c a p i t a l  g o o d s  o f  h i g h  
t e c h n o l o g y  t o  J a p a n .  
A m a j o r  . c o n c e r n  o v e r  t h e  c o m m o d i t y  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  J a p a n ,  
h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  t e n d  t o  h a v e  l o w  i n c o m e  a n d  p r i c e  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  ( smal l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s a l e s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  i n c r e a s e s  i n  i n c o m e .  o r  
d e c r e a s e s  i n  p r i c e ) .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  
q u a n t i t y  o f  U.S. e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  b u y  t h e  s a m e  
q u a n t i t y  o f  i m p o r t s  f r o m  J a p a n  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s .  E v e n  i f  
b o t h  e c o n o m i e s  g r o w  a t  t h e  s a m e  r a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e  w o u l d  t e n d  
t o  move i n  J a p a n ' s  f a v o r  a s  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  h i g h  t e c h n o l o g y  m a n u f a c t u r e s  
i n c r e a s e s  f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  U.S.  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t  e x p o r t s .  A k e y  t o  
l o n g - t e r m  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  t r a d e  i m b a l a n c e  w i t h  J a p a n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  t o  s h i f t  
t h e  c o m m o d i t y  c o m p o s i t o n  o f  U.S.  e x p o r t s  t o w a r d  h i g h e r  v a l u e - a d d e d  
m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s .  
POLICY OPTIONS 
D u r i n g  t h e  9 6 t h  C o n g r e s s ,  t h e  H o u s e  p a s s e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  ( H . C o n . R e s .  3 7 6 )  
s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  t h e  b i l a t e r a l  d e f i c i t  a n d  i t s  p r o j e c t e d  
g r o w t h  a r e  i n t o l e r a b l e  a n d  u n a c c e p t a b l e  a n d  t h r e a t e n  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  v e r y  
s u b s t a n t i a l  a n d  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t t e r n  o f  t r a d e  w h i c h  h a s  e x i s t e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  
U n i t e C  S t a t e s  a n d  J a p a n .  The  r e s o l u t i o n  u r g e d  J a p a n  t o  a s s u m e  a g r e a t e r  
s e n s e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  a n d  t a k e  s u c h  s t e p s  i n  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  h e l p  c o r r e c t  t h e  
d e f i c i t .  S e v e r a l  b i l l s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s p e c i f i c  t r a d e  p r o b l e m s  a r e  a l s o  b e i n g  
i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  9 7 t h  C o n g r e s s .  C o n g r e s s  a l s o  p l a y s  a  k e y  r o l e  i n  o v e r s i g h t  
a n d  b r i n g i n g  t o  p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  t r a d i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
I n  1 9 8 2 ,  s e v e r a l  S i l l s  h a v e  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d  t h a t  f o c u s  o n  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  
a c c e s s  t o  m a r k e t s  o f  m a j o r  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  J a p a n .  I n  a 
s e n s e ,  r e c i p r o c i t y  p r o p o s a l s  a t t e m p t  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  common c o m p l a i n t  o f  U.S.  
b u s i n e s s e s '  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  s h u t  o u t  o f  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s ,  w h i l e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
h a v e  e a s y  a c c e s s  t o  t h o s e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  
R e c i p r o c i t y  d i f f e r s  f r o m  r e c i p r o c a l  c o n c e s s i o n s  a s  p r a c t i c e d  d u r i n g  r e c e n t  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  R e c i p r o c i t y  a t t e m p t s  t o  e q u a l i z e  t h e  d e g r e e  
o f  o p e n n e s s  o f  s p e c i f i c  m a r k e t s  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  i n  t i m e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  
m a t c h  c o n c e s s i o n s  among  c o u n t r i e s  W i t h  d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  
F o r  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  J a p a n  w h i c h  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  made  l a r g e  t r a d e  c o n c e s s i o n s  
b u t  w h i c h  h a v e  h a d  a  h i s t o r y  o f  p r o t e c t e d  m a r k e t s ,  r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  b e i n g  
v i e w e d  w i t h  some  alarm. R e c i p r o c i t y  a l s o  c a n  b e c o m e  m e r e l y  a n o t h e r  a t t e m p t  
t o  j u s t i f y  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  U.S. p r o d u c e r s .  P o t e n t i a l l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e c i p r o c i t y  
c o u l d  be  e f f e c t i v e  i n  r e d u c i n g  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a b r o a d .  
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In the past, the typical scenario for the resolution of trade disputes 
with Japan has been as follows: The United States identifies a specific 
problem and raises it with Japan. The Japanese respond that either the 
problem is minor or not much can be done about it. Time passes without much 
action. Often Congress then will bring publicity and pressure to bear on the 
problem until it is escalated to the brink of a political breach. An 
agreement is finally struck which the United States often views as minimal, 
and Japan views as being forced without due concern for its own problems. 
The crisis passes, but as this cycle is repeated, resentment begins to 
accumulate in both countries. 
The danger with this process is that over the long-term it undermines the 
fundamentally strong relationship between the two countries. This is 
especially serious if Japan views itself as a scapegoat for problems of U.S. 
domestic industries, and many Americans' view Japan as the cause of their 
economic problems. 
The Reagan Administration feels that economic issues between the two 
countries have been and should continue to be given early and mutually 
satifactory solutions in the spirit of good will and cooperation. 
The policies open to Congress to deal either directly or indirectly with 
the bilateral trade imbalance with Japan center on restrictions against 
Japanese exports, promotion of U.S. exports, and measures to enhance the 
strength of the U.S. economy. Policies to reduce dependence on imported oil 
and to ease the regulatory burden on domestic exporting industries can also 
be important. 
SPECIFIC TRACE ISSUES 
Despite the general public focus on disagreements and complaints in the 
U.S.-Japan trading relationship, most bilateral trade issues are being 
resolvea in a manner generally agreeable to both sides. Easier problems tend 
to be solved first; however. Those remaining are more difficult. 
Motor Vehicles. Sales of imported passenger cars from Japan more than 
aoubled from 817,000 units in 1975 to 1,858,913 units in 1981 when they 
accounted for 21.8% of all new car sales. This market penetration coincided 
with a large downturn in sales in the U.S. automobile market as well as a 
massive switch by consumers to smaller and more fuel-efficient cars. During 
1980, sales of domestically produced automobiles dropped by 2.1 million units 
under their 1979 level, while sales of Japanese imported models rose by 
89,000 units, 5.0%.. This contributed to the layoffs and financial losses 
reported by the four major U.S. producers. 
On Nov. 12, 1980, however, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
rejected petitions by the United Auto Workers union and the Ford Motor 
Company for temporary relief from import competition in passenger cars and 
trucks. The Commission determined that imports of either type of vehicle 
were not a substantial cause of severe injury to the domestic auto industry. 
The recession and general downturn in demand for motor vehicles were 
considered to be more important causes of injury. Under current law, this 
implied that protection from imports was not justified. 
Following the Commission's decision, the focus of efforts to assist the 
automobile industry has shifted to Congress an8 the Administration. 
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On May 2, 1981, the Japanese Government agreed voluntarily to restrict 
exports of passenger cars to the United States to 1.68 million units during 
the 92-month period beginning Apr. 1, 1981. In March 1982, Japan agreed to 
extend the 1.68 million ceiling for another year. For the third year, they 
intend to monitor exports to eliminate any surges. Other measures currently 
being considered include providing a consumer subsidy or tax credit for 
purchasing a new ear, restricing consumer credit for the purchase of a 
japanese imported car, easing of regulations pertaining to autos, 
establishing import quotas or local content requirements for motor vehicles, 
as well as general tax measures to improve the economic climate and provide 
for faster write-off of depreciation. 
The United Auto Workers have favored domestic (local) content legislation 
that requires all automobiles and light trucks sold in the United States in 
large numbers to contain a certain proportion of American parts and labor. 
Efforts are also being made to reduce barriers to U.S. auto sales in 
Japan's domestic automobile market and to facilitate sales of automotive 
parts to Japan. 
(This problem is covered in more detail in Issue Brief 80030, Automobiles 
Imported From Japan and Issue Brief 82056, Automobile Domestic Content 
.Requirements,) 
Telecommunications Equipment. On Dec. 18, 1980, Japan agreed to open its 
market for telecommunications equipment bought by the Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Public Corporation (NTT). This concluded several years of somewhat 
acrimonious negotiations in which the U.S. took an unusually firm stand in 
the face of continued resistance by the Japanese government. 
Under the terms of the three-year agreement, the requirements of the 
Gcvernrnent Procurement Code, negotiated during the Tokyo Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, are tc be observed for all purchases by NTT 
as well as for all of Japan's central government ministries and agencies. As 
a result, more than $8 billion of procurement by the Japanese government will 
be open to international competition on a non-discriminatory basis. Of this 
total, $3.3 billion is accounted for by NTT purchases. 
With the addition of NTT's purchases to the Procurement Code, the United 
States felt it had achieved the necessary reciprocity with Japan in 
commerical opportunities which the Code envisages. The three-year period is 
viewed as a trial to see if NTT actually does purchase U.S. 
telecommunications equipment. 
U.S. Tobacco Exports. All aspects of tobacco manufacture and sales in 
Japan are controlled by the government's Tobacco and Salt Monopoly. This 
monopoly has curtailed competition (all foreign) by restricting the number 
of outlets authorized to sell imported tobacco products, setting prices for 
imported brands at about 110 to 140 yen ($0.50 to $0.65) more than Japanese 
brands, and banning advertising of imported products. 
Effective Apr. 1, 1980, the Japanese legislature converted the monopoly's 
pricing policies to equally restrictive tariffs that actually increased the 
price differential between Japanese and U.S. cigarettes. 
After a long series of negotiations, however, on Nov. 21, 1980, Japan 
agreed to reduce tobacco tariffs from 90% to 35% on cigarettes, 60% to 35% on 
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cigars, and 110% to 60% on pipe tobacco. Profit mar,gins on sales of imported 
cigarettes are to rise to equal those of domestic brands; the number of 
authorized retailers selling foreign tobacco products is to increase in 1981 
from 14,000 to 20,000; and U.S. companies are to be permitted to advertise. 
As a result, U.S. tobacco sales in Japan were expected to rise from $35 
million to about $350 million annually. In May 1982, Japan pledged to 
increase the number of authorized retailers to 70,000 by April 1983 and 
eventually to allow all outlets to handle non-Japanese brands. 
Exports of finished tobacco products to Japan, however, are still highly 
restricted, and efforts to reduce barriers will continue. In October 1982, 
Japan refused a U.S. request to eliminate the 35% import tariff. 
Product Approval Procedures and Standards. The Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade negotiated under txe Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations has forced Japan to bring many of its practices into conformity 
with international standards. In addition, institutions now exist to enable 
U.S. exporters to resolve problems dealing with procedures or standards in 
exporting to Japan. 
The restrictive effect on U.S. exports caused by Japanese safety, health, 
an.8 other standards has been documented by many "horror stories" among U.S. 
firms. Major problems have been (1) product approval requirements generally 
oriented toward design rather than performance characteristics; (2) 
difficulty in obtaining information on specific standards and inspection 
procedures to be applied; (3) excluding foreign manufacturers from 
deliberations on establishing and promulgating standards; (4) the requirement 
that approval be obtained through a resident company; (5) the required 
release by U.S. firms of proprietary information; and (6) the general mandate 
that all testing (except for automobiles) and approval occur in Japan. 
Fortunately, much progress has been made in overcoming these problems. 
Part of the credit can go to the U.S.-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee 
(TFC) whose U.S. offices are housed in the Department of Commerce. As of 
September 1982, Americans had filed 117 complaints with the U.S. side of the 
TFC. Cf this total, 59 were discontinued after investigation, 17 were 
resolved informally, 5 were under investigation, and 36 were formally 
submitted to the Tokyo TFC office for action. Of these 36, 24 have been 
favorably resolved, 6 withdrawn and 6 were in progress. 
Problems still remain, however, in products such as cosmetics, medical 
equipment, and automobiles, where it is claimed that standards and procedures 
continue to impede U.S. sales. Japanese-customs officials also have been 
accused of being overly thorough and arbitrary. Until full reciprocity is 
achieved in standards and approval procedures, Congressional efforts to 
achieve reciprocity as well as in support of the TFC and other institutions 
will be important. The list of issues to be pursued by the U.S. Trade 
Representative includes asking Japan to reconsider the stringent Japanese 
emission standards for U.S.-made cars as well as health and environmental 
standards as applied to such U.S. product areas as pharmaceuticals and 
cosmetics. 
Agricultural Products. Japan is the single most important market for U.S. 
agricultural exports. In 1981, Japan bought $5.9 billion worth of food feed, 
- and beverages in addition to another $1.9 billion worth of unmanufactured 
cotton, tobacco, soybeans and animal skins from the United States. Japan 
imports about half of its food requirements, and demand is growing rapidly. 
U n l i k e  J a p a n ' s  p o l i c y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  g r a d u a i l y  m o s t  - p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i t s  
i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ,  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i t s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  r e m a i n s  s o l i d ,  
Farmers s t i l l  a c c o u n t  f o r  a b o u t  1 0 %  o f  J a p a n ' s  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  w i e l d  a 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  a m o u n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  w i t h i n  t h e  r u l i n g  L i b e r a l  
D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y .  J a p a n  a l s o  h o l d s  a b a s i c  c o n c e r n  o v e r  f o o d  s e c u r i t y  t h a t  
r i v a l s  c o n c e r n  o v e r  m i l i t a r y  s e c u r i t y  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  
O v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  J a p a n  h a s  d e v e l o p e d  a s y s t e m  o f  p r i c e  s u p p o r t s  a n d  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i t s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  t h a t  i s  h i g h l y  i n e f f i c ~ e n t ,  c o s t l y  t o  
a d m i n i s t e r ,  t e n d s  t o  p r o d u c e  t o o  much r i c e  a n d  n o t  e n o u g h  o t h e r  f o o d s ,  b u t  
o n e  t h a t  i s  h i g h l y  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  f a r m e r s  a n d  t o  i m p o r t e r s  f o r t u n a t e  e n o u g h  t o  
b e  a l l o c a t e d  p a r t  o f  t h e  i 3 p o r t  q u o t a s .  E v e n  t h o u g h  f o o d  c o s t s  7 0 %  m o r e  i n  
T o k y o  t h a n  i n  N e w  Y o r k  C i t y  o r  P a r i s ,  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  s o l i d l y  e n t r e n c h e d  a n d  
a p p a r e n t l y  h a s  l i t t l e  o p p o s i t i o n  f r o m  c o n s u m e r  g r o u p s .  
U.S. e x p o r t s  o f  b e e f  a n d  c i t r u s  p r o d u c t s  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  b e e n  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  D u r i n g  t h e  T o k y o  R o u n d  o f  M u l t i l a t e r a l  T r a d e  N e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
J a p a n  a g r e e d  t o  a 1 4 , 0 0 0  m e t r i c  t o n  i n c r e a s e  i n  i t s  q u o t a  f o r  h i g h  q u a l i t y  
b e e f  t o  3 0 , 8 0 0  m e t r i c  t o n s  b y  1 9 8 3 .  J a p a n  a l s o  i n t ' e n d s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  q u o t a  
f o r  c i t r u s  ( f r e s h  o r a n g e s  a n d  o r a n g e  j u i c e )  b y  1 7 , 0 0 0  m e t r i c  t o n s  b y  1 9 8 3 .  
T h e s e  i n c r e a s e s  a r e  S m a l l  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  p o t e n t i a l  d e m a n d ,  b u t  r e p r e s e n t  
some l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .  C u r r e n t l y  J a p a n  b u y s  a b o u t  h a l f  o f  a l l  U.S. e x p o r t s  o f  
b e e f  ( b y  w e i g h t )  a n d  a b o u t  4 0 %  o f  U.S.  e x p o r t s  o f  c i t r u s  f r u i t s .  
T h e  p r i c e  o f  w h e a t  i n  J a p a n  i s  a l s o  h e l d  a r t i f i c i a l l y  h i g h  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  
p e o p l e  f r o m  s u b s t i t u t i n g  i t  f o r  r i c e  w h i c h  i s  i n  s u r p i u s .  T h i s  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
t o  h a v e  a  d a m p e n n i n g  e f f e c t  on U.S.  s a l e s  o f  w h e a t  t h e r e .  
C o n g r e s s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  o v e r s i g h t  a n d  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h i s  C o u n t r y ' s  n e g o t i a t i n g  e f f o r t s  i n  l i b e r a l i z i n g  J a p a n ' s  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  i m p o r t  s e c t o r .  C o n g r e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o u l d  a l s o  a s s i s t  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  p l a c i n g  i t s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y  o n  a m o r e  e c o n o m i c  
b a s i s  b y  a l l a y i n g  s o m e  o f  t h e  b a s i c  J a p a n e s e  f e a r s  o v e r  t h e  i n s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  
f o o C  i m p o r t s .  T h e  H o u s e  Ways a n d  Means C o m m i t t e e  h a s  s u g g e s t e d  t w o  a c t i c n s  
t h a t  c o u l d  b e  t a k e n .  One w o u l d  b e  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e p e a t  o f  a  
f o o d  e m b a r g o  l i k e  t h a t  on s o y b e a n  e x p o r t s  t o  J a p a n  w h i c h  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
N i x o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Even  t h e  R u s s i a n  g r a i n  e m b a r g o  w o r r i e d  J a p a n .  S e c o n d ,  
w o u l d  b e  t o  p r o v i d e  J a p a n  w i t h  l o n g - t e r m  g u a r a n t e e s  o n  U.S.  f o o d  e x p o r t s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  C h i n a .  The U.S .  p l e d g e  
made i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 0  t o  p r o v i d e  2 2 . 5  m i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  g r a i n s  t o  J a p a n  i n  1 9 8 1  
w a s  a p o s i t i v e  s t e p  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
C i v i l  A v i a t i o n  A g r e e m e n t .  I n  J u n e  1 9 8 2 ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  J a p a n  
c o n c l u d e d  a 3 - y e a r  a v i a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  w i l l  b o o s t  s e r v i c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  
c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  c o n c l u d e d  1 8  m o n t h s  o f  d i f f i c u l t  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  B a r g a i n i n g  
o n  i s s u e s  s t i l l  U n s e t t l e d  i s  s c h e d u l e d  t o  b e g i n  by  t h e  e n d  o f  1 9 8 3 .  
T h e  new a g r e e m e n t  w i l l  a l l o w  U n i t e d  A i r l i n e s  t o  i n i t i a t e  s e r v i c e  t o  J a p a n ,  
C o n t i n e n t a l  A i r l i n e s  t o  e x p a n d  f l i g h t s  t o  J a p a n  f r o m  M i c r o n e s i a ,  a n d  a n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c h a r t e r  f l i g h t s  b y  e a c h  c o u n t r y .  J a p a n  A i r l i n e s  
w i l l  b e  p e r m i t t e d  f l i g h t s  l i n k i n g  Tokyo  w i t h  S e a t t l e  a n d  C h i c a g o  a n d  t o  p i c k  
u p  p a s s e n g e r s  i n  L o s  A n g e l e s  on f l i g h t s  f r o m  T o k y o  t o  B r a z i l .  
D e s p i t e  t h e  new a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  1 9 5 2  
U . S . - J a p a n  C i v i l  A i r  T r a n s p o r t  A g r e e m e n t  a s  u n b a l a n c e d  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  U.S. 
Y E N / D O L L A R  E X C H A N G E  R A T E  
Under the current floating exchange rate system, currency values are 
determined mainly by market forces according to supply and demand. such a 
system is. designed to rectify imbalances in flows of goods, services, and 
capital by making those currencies in low demand cheaper (those with trade 
deficits or large capital outflows) and those currencies in high demand more 
expensive (those with export surpluses or large capital inflows). 
Exchange adjustments, however, will not necessarily rectify bilateral 
merchandise imbalances, because currency markets reflect supply and demand 
conditions for all international transactions and for all countries. During 
1980, the yen appreciated against the dollar, which diminished the trade 
deficit by making Japanese exports more expensive for Americans and U.S. 
exports less expensive for Japanese. Recently, however, the appreciation of 
the dollar has reversed that trend. Price, however, is not the only factor 
affecting the bilateral trade balance. Product quality, availability, sales 
effort, and the operating efficiency of products also are important. In 
highly "differentiated" manufactures (such as machine tools and automobiles), 
for example, higher Japanese prices usually have resulted in more (not less) 
money spent on those products. U.S. manufacturers of competing products, 
moreover, often will raise their prices as the yen appreciates, thereby 
eliminating any U.S. price advantage. 
Many Japanese blame high U.S. interest rates which have attracted capital 
from abroad and stengthened the dollar as the major culprit in causing the 
bilateral trade deficit to grow. 
As shown in Table 3, the yen dollar exchange rate has fluctuated widely 
between as much as 300 to as little as 210 yen per dollar (in terms of yearly 
averages). During the fourth quarter 1978, the exchange rate dropped to 190 
yen per dollar. 
TABLE 3 
YEN/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE 
YEAR RATE DATE 
1st Quarter 1980 
2nd Quarter 1980 
3rd Quarter 1980 
4th Quarter 1980 
1st Quarter 1981 
2nd Quarter 1981 
3rd Quarter .I981 
4th Quarter 1981 
1st Quarter' 1982 
2nd Quarter 1982 
3rd Quarter 1982 
Oct. 30, 1982 
Nov. 30, 1982 
RATE 
JAPANESE PROTECTIONISM 
A commonly held view is that the Japanese market is extremely difficult to 
penetrate because of protectionist policies of the Japanese government. This 
was certainly true during the immediate postwar period, but over the past 15 
Years, Japan has gradually reduced the level of protection of its industrial 
sector. Japan's agricultural sector, however, remains highly protected. 
In terms of tariffs on industrial imports, Japan's are scheduled to fall 
from an average of 5.0% to -2.5% over the first. 7 years of the 1980s. 
(Comparable U.S. tariffs are to fall from 6.1% to 4.2%.) Japan's tariff on 
computer mainframes will be reduced in stages from the bound rate of 15% to- 
4%. Integrated circuits from 15% to 4.2% peripheral equipment from 25% to 6% 
and color film in rolls from 40% to 4%. The duty on automobiles was 
programmed to be reduced from 30% or 20% depending on vehicle size, to 3%, 
but in an effort to respond to pressing criticism of market access denial, 
the Japanese have completely eliminated the duty on all imported automobiles. 
Tariffs on most industrial products, therefore, are not a serious barrier to 
imports. 
According to a 1980 report by the House Ways and Means Committee, "Japan 
today is generally zn open trading nation, although some very tough residual 
attitudes of protectionism remain." Nontariff barriers, in particular, can 
be diffleult to surmount. These include onerous approval and inspection 
prccedures, difficulties with customs officials, problems breaking into 
Japan's distribution system, and rigid import quotas. In December 1981, the 
United States presented Japan a list of trade barriers hindering U.S. exports 
there. In January, Japan agreed to reduce nontariff barriers on 67 items. 
Japan also intends to speed up the reduction in tariff rates on some 1,600 
commodities. 
JAPANESE COMPETITIVENESS 
A favorite Japanese explanation for their export successes in the United 
States is that their export industries are simply more competitive than their 
U.S. counterparts. This explanation implies an athletic, not an economic, 
definition of competition. It implies more efficient production processes, 
better product design, better quality control, lower costs, or some 
combination of the above. 
The truth is in some industries, such as steel, television receivers, 
automobiles, and shipbuilding, Japan's manufacturing processes are more 
productive on average than those in the United States. Certain U.S. .plants, 
however, are as efficient as some of the best in Japan. Certain U.S. sectors 
(heavy equipment, airplanes), moreover, completely dominate Japanese 
competitors. Virtually all of Japan's export industries, however, are highly 
competitive, otherwise, they could not survive in world markets. Sectors of 
the Japanse economy less exposed to international competition, such as 
agriculture, retailing, and services, however, are generally much less 
efficient than their U.S. counterparts. 
Recent trends indicate that Japan's competitive position is likely to 
improve during the 1980s. Labor productivity has been increasing faster and 
wages rising more slowly in Japan than in the United States. Between' 1975 
and 1979, for example, labor costs per unit of output in manufacturing rose 
by 30% in the United States, as compared to virtually no change in Japan. In 
Short, during that period in Japan all wage increases were matched by 
productivity increases, whereas in the United States, wages rose 30% faster 
than productivity. Dollar devaluation, of course, offsets this difference,to 
some extent, but the underlying trend indicates that the'united States could 
face even more severe challenges from 'Japan in the future. 
The solutions being proposed to enhance U.S. competitiveness fall under 
the rubric of reindustrialization or revitalization as. well as in quality 
sontrol circles and other programs to enhance savings, investment, production 
efficiency, and product quality. 
FUTURE OF THE BILATERAL TRADE IMBALANCE 
The prospects for substantially and permanently reducing the bilateral 
merchandise trade imbalance with Japan are uncertain. During 1982, as the 
U.S. economy recovers and the Japanese economy continues to slow down, 
imports from Japan are expected to rise. With the U.S. recovery, total 
consumption should increase -- including consumption of imports from Japan. 
In the past, Japanese. recessions usually have forced export drives to 
compensate for sluggish demand at home. Meanwhile, the slowing- of Japan's 
economy during the first half of 1982 should temporarily temper U.S. exports 
thare. 
Automotive vehicle exports to the United States, however, should level 
off, as U.S. producers continue to introduce new models, build inventories of 
smalier, more fuel-efficient cars, and as Japan's voluntary export restraints 
take effect. Japanese automakers, however, appear to be compensating for the 
quantitative restriction by shipping larger and more expensive cars. The 
value of Japanese auto exports to the United States, therefore, will likely 
continue to rise. The 24% tariff on pickup trucks from Japan (in effect from 
August 1980) should reduce truck imports somewhat. The depreciation of the 
yen relative to the dollar in 1981, however, will make Japanese exports more 
price competitive in U.S. markets and U.S. exports less competitive in 
Japanese markets. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Japan for 1982, 
however, is likely to exceed the $15.8 billion for 1981. 
LEGISLATION 
Note: Legislation related to automobile imports is in Issue Brief 
80030, Automobiles Imported from Japan. 
H.Con.Res. 210 (Neal et al.) 
Expresses the sense of Congress that the President should negotiate an 
agreement with Japan providing that Japan pay an annual security tax to 
compensate the U.S. for expenditures made for Japan's security. 
H.Con.Res. 213 (Zablocki et al.) 
Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the U.S. and Japan should exert 
maximum efforts to resist Soviet challenges in Asia; ( 2 )  Japan should make a 
greater contribution to its own defense; and (3) Japan's defense expenditures 
should be at least one percent of its gross national product. Introduced 
Nov. 4 ,  1981; ref.erred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
H.R. 4346 (Jones et al.) 
Implements certain recommendations of the United States-Japan Economic 
relations group report of January 1981; assists in continued long-range 
improvements in U.S.-Japan relations. Introduced July 30, 1981; referred to 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, and Post Office and Civil 
Service. 
H. R. 5457 (Brodhead) 
Amends the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to reciprocal market access. 
Introduced Feb. 4 ,  1982; referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 
H.R. 5614 (Richmond) 
Provides for fair trade between the United States and Japan. Introduced 
Feb. 24, 1982; referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 
H.R. 5616 (Schulze) 
Imposes a higher tariff on certain imports from Japan for two years. 
Int'roduced Feb:24, 1982; referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 
H.R. 5860 (Bereuter, et al.) 
Authorizes the President to impose trade restrictions on foreign countries 
which impose nontariff trade barriers on imports of U.S. agricultural goods. 
Introduced Mar. 17, 1982; referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 
H.R. 6986 (Regula et al.) 
Authorizes the President to impose a tariff surcharge on the products of 
certain countries to offset the expense of providing U.S. defense assistance. 
Introduced Aug. 12, 1982; referred to the Committee on Ways and Means-. 
S.Con.Res. 46 (Levin et al.) 
Same as H.Con.Res. 213. 
S-Res. 462 (Bentsen, et al.) 
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the U.S. should seek open access to 
the Japanese market for U.S. beef and citrus and if U ~ S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~  the U.S. 
should evaluate what remedies are appropriate. Introduced Sept. 14, 1982; 
referred to Committees on Foreign Relations and Finance. Sept. 30, 1982, 
measure reported from the Committee on Finance (S.Rept. 97-642) and passed 
Senate. 
S.Res. 516 (Grassley, et al.) 
Sense of the Senate urging Presidential action on petition to disqualify 
certain Japanese machine tools from the U.S. investment tax credit. 
Introduced Dec. 15, 1982; referred to the Committee on Finance. 
Promotes foreign trade ic services, including removal of unfair trade 
practices in service sector trade. Introduced Feb. 3, 1982; referred to the 
Committee on Finance. 
Amends the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to reciprocal market access. 
Introduced Feb. 4 ,  1982; referred to the Committee on Finance. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
12/16/82 -- U.S. steelmakers petition for a reduction in steel 
imports from Japan and a 25% surcharge to offset an 
"undervalued yen." 
12/15/82 -- Domestic content legislation for autos passed House. 
11/30/82 -- U.S. broke off talks with Japan after reaching impasse 
on liberalizing beef and Citrus and reducing tobacco 
tariff. Negotiators agreed, however, to recommend 
that government-sponsored research on high technology 
be opened to resident subsidiaries of each country. 
11/15/82 -- U.S. lodged a protest with GATT against Japan's import 
restrictions on leather goods. 
39/30/82 -- S.Res. 462 passed Senate. 
06/07/82 -- U.S. and Japan reach 3-year aviation pact. 
05/27/82 -- Japan announced a second package of trade measures to 
eliminate or reduce tariffs, increase U.S. tobacco 
sales, and provide national treatment for foreign 
subsidiaries in Japan. 
04/27/82 -- U.S. placed restrictions on Japanese fishing rights 
within the 200-mile limit. 
04/01/82 -- Japan cut import tariffs on 1653 items. 
03/30/82 -- Japan announced it would keep the voluntary restraint 
on auto exports by another year. 
03/22/82 -- U.S. officials asked Japanese to purchase American rice. 
01/27/82 -- Japan agreed to lower 67 of 99 nontariff barriers and to 
create ombudsman to handle trade friction. 
12/00/81 -- U.S. presented Japan a list of trade barriers of 
concern to U.S. exporters. 
12/08/81 -- Japan reduced import quotas for beef by 4,000 tons for 
Jan.-June 1982. 
12/01/81 -- Senate Finance Committee hearing on the U.S. auto industry. 
Japan warned of possible U.S. protectionist measures. 
11/18/81 -- The Reagan Administration submitted to the Japanese 
government a list of tariff and nontariff barriers 
contributing to the bilateral trade deficit. 
11/04/81 -- Joint Economic Committee hearing on Japanese productivity, 
09/21/81 -- U.S. and Japan.established a subcabinet committee on trade. 
09/08/81 -- Special Trade Negotiator Brock warned Japan to reduce 
its trade surplus with the U.S. 
09/01/81 -- U.S. and Japan announced their intention to begin talks 
on exchanging Alaskan oil for Japanese-bound Mexican 
crude oil. 
08/19/81 -- Pres. Reagan asked Japan to build up its 
reserves of American grain to the equivalent of at 
least two months consumption. 
07/30/81 -- Rep. Jones et al. introduced H.R. 4346 to assist in 
long-range improvements in U.S.-Japan relations. 
07/28/81 -- Joint Economic Committee concluded hearings on 
Japanese and American Economic Policies and 
Productivity. 
07/21/81 -- Japan increased imports of frozen chickens from the U.S. 
and elsewhere. U.S. exports take 61% of Japan's chicken 
market from January-May, 1981. 
05/22/81 -- U.S. and Japan ended talks on civil aviation with no 
agreement or a date to resume meetings. 
05/12/81 -- Japan agreed to cut tariffs on semiconductors from 
10.1% to 4.2% by April 1982 instead of 1987. 
05/09/81 -- President Reagan 'and Prime Minister Suzuki concluded 
talks. 
05/02/81 -- Japan agreed to voluntarily restrict passenger car 
exports to the United States. 
04/29/81 -- Japan stated that the U.S. did not consult with 
Japan in lifting the Soviet grain embargo. 
04/20/81 -- Washington accepted responsibility for the sinking 
on April 9 of the Japanese freighter Nissho Maru by a 
U.S. submarine. 
03/30/81 -- Japan Foreign Minister Ito conferred with the President 
on autos and other bilateral issues. 
03/09/81 -- Japan's aluminum industry protested the 195 percent 
increase in 1980 of imports of aluminum from the 
United States. 
03/05/81 -- Japanese lumber dealers asked Japanese trading companies 
to reduce wood imports from the U.S. and Canada. 
02/10/81 -- U.S. Ambassador Mansfield and Japanese Prime Minister 
Suzuki met to discuss pending trade issues. 
01/29/81 -- Pan American World Airways received approval from Japan 
to stop in Tokyo on flights between the U.S. and China. 
01/12/81 -- U.S. and Japan began talks on the ~apan-U.S. bilateral 
civil aviation agreement. 
12/30/80 -- Japan adopted a 7.6 budgetary increase in defense 
expenditures rather than the targeted 9.7 percent 
increase. 
.12/19/80 -- U.S. and Japan reached agreement. on telecommunications 
equipment purchases by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Public Corp. 
12/10/80 -- U.S. pledged to supply Japan with 22.5 million tons of 
agricultural commodities in 1981. 
11/22/80 -- Japan agreed to reduce import duties on tobacco products 
and provide other concessions to the U.S. tobacco industry. 
11/17/80 -- H.Con.Res. 376 expressing concern over the level of the 
trade deficit with Japan passed the House and was referred 
to the Senate Finance Committee (Nov. 19, 1980). 
11/12/80 -- U.S. International Trade Commission determined that imports 
of automobiles and trucks are not a substantial cause of 
injury to the U.S. auto industry. 
10/10/80 -- Joint Economic Committee held hearing on U.S.-Japan trade 
relations. 
09/18/80 -- House Ways anC Means Committee held hearing on trade with 
Japan. 
08/26/80 -- House Ways and Means Committee held hearing on trade with 
Japan. 
